Which amendment gives us freedom to travel and live anywhere

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Challenges to durational residency requirements have traditionally been made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1999, however, the Court approved a doctrinal shift, so that state laws that distinguished between their own citizens, based on how long they had been in the state, would be evaluated instead under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Footnote
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–03 (1999) . The Court did not, however, question the continuing efficacy of the earlier cases.

A durational residency requirement creates two classes of persons: those who have been within the state for the prescribed period and those who have not.2 Footnote
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972) . Because the right to travel is implicated by state distinctions between residents and nonresidents, the relevant constitutional provision is the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, § 2, cl. 1. But persons who have moved recently, at least from state to state,3 Footnote
Intrastate travel is protected to the extent that the classification fails to meet equal protection standards in some respect. Compare Hadnott v. Amos , 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d. per curiam, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) , with Arlington County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) . The same principle applies in the Commerce Clause cases, in which discrimination may run against in-state as well as out-of-state concerns. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) . have exercised a right protected by the Constitution, and the durational residency classification either deters the exercise of that right or penalizes those who have exercised it.4 Footnote
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31, 638 (1969) ; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338–42 (1972) ; Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) ; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 420–21 (1981) . See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 236–39 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), and id. at 285–92 (Stewart and Blackmun, JJ., and Burger, C.J.). Any such classification is invalid “unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” 5 Footnote
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis by Court); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1971) . The constitutional right to travel has long been recognized,6 Footnote
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (both cases in context of direct restrictions on travel). The source of the right to travel and the reasons for reliance on the Equal Protection Clause are questions puzzled over and unresolved by the Court. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758, 759 (1966) , and id. at 763–64 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), id. at 777 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969) , and id. at 671 ((Harlan, J., dissenting); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1973) ; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417–19 (1981) ; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982) , and id. at 66–68 (Brennan, J., concurring), 78–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). but it is only relatively recently that the strict standard of equal protection review has been applied to nullify durational residency requirements.

Thus, in Shapiro v. Thompson ,7 Footnote
394 U.S. 618 (1969) . durational residency requirements conditioning eligibility for welfare assistance on one year’s residence in the state8 Footnote
The durational residency provision established by Congress for the District of Columbia was also voided. 394 U.S. at 641–42 . were voided. If the purpose of the requirements was to inhibit migration by needy persons into the state or to bar the entry of those who came from low-paying states to higher-paying ones in order to collect greater benefits, the Court said, the purpose was impermissible.9 Footnote
394 U.S. at 627–33 . Gaddis v. Wyman , 304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) , aff’d sub nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970) , struck down a provision construed so as to bar only persons who came into the state solely to obtain welfare assistance. If, on the other hand, the purpose was to serve certain administrative and related governmental objectives—the facilitation of the planning of budgets, the provision of an objective test of residency, minimization of opportunity for fraud, and encouragement of early entry of new residents into the labor force—then the requirements were rationally related to the purpose but they were not compelling enough to justify a classification that infringed a fundamental interest.10 Footnote
394 U.S. at 633–38 . Shapiro was reaffirmed in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down durational residency requirements for aliens applying for welfare assistance), and in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (voiding requirement of one year’s residency in county as condition to indigent’s receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at county’s expense). When Connecticut and New York reinstituted the requirements, pleading a financial emergency as the compelling state interest, they were summarily rebuffed. Rivera v. Dunn , 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971) , aff’d per curiam, 404 U.S. 1054 (1972) ; Lopez v. Wyman , Civ. No.

However, a state one-year durational residency requirement for the initiation of a divorce proceeding was sustained in Sosna v. Iowa .14 Footnote
419 U.S. 393 (1975) . Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan dissented on the merits. Id. at 418 . Although it is not clear what the precise basis of the ruling is, it appears that the Court found that the state’s interest in requiring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the state and its desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack justified the requirement.15 Footnote
419 U.S. at 409 . But the Court also indicated that the plaintiff was not absolutely barred from the state courts, but merely required to wait for access (which was true in the prior cases as well and there held immaterial), and that possibly the state interests in marriage and divorce were more exclusive and thus more immune from federal constitutional attack than were the matters at issue in the previous cases. The Court also did not indicate whether it was using strict or traditional scrutiny. Similarly, durational residency requirements for lower in-state tuition at public colleges have been held constitutionally justifiable, again, however, without a clear statement of reason.16 Footnote
Starns v. Malkerson , 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) , aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) . Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 & n.9 (1973) , and id. at 456, 464, 467 (dicta). In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974) , the Court, noting the results, stated that “some waiting periods . . . may not be penalties” and thus would be valid. More recently, the Court has attempted to clarify these cases by distinguishing situations where a state citizen is likely to “consume” benefits within a state’s borders (such as the provision of welfare) from those where citizens of other states are likely to establish residency just long enough to acquire some portable benefit, and then return to their original domicile to enjoy them (such as obtaining a divorce decree or paying the in-state tuition rate for a college education).17 Footnote
Saenz v. Roe , 526 U.S. at 505 .

A state scheme for returning to its residents a portion of the income earned from the vast oil deposits discovered within Alaska foundered upon the formula for allocating the dividends; that is, each adult resident received one unit of return for each year of residency subsequent to 1959, the first year of Alaska’s statehood. The law thus created fixed, permanent distinctions between an ever-increasing number of classes of bona fide residents based on how long they had been in the state. The differences between the durational residency cases previously decided did not alter the bearing of the right to travel principle upon the distribution scheme, but the Court’s decision went off on the absence of any permissible purpose underlying the apportionment classification and it thus failed even the rational basis test.18 Footnote
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) . Somewhat similar was the Court’s invalidation on equal protection grounds of a veterans preference for state employment limited to persons who were state residents when they entered military service; four Justices also thought the preference penalized the right to travel. At’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) .

Still unresolved are issues such as durational residency requirements for occupational licenses and other purposes.19 Footnote
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) , upholding a two-year residence requirement to become an insurance broker, must be considered of questionable validity. Durational periods for admission to the practice of law or medicine or other professions have evoked differing responses by lower courts. But this line of cases does not apply to state residency requirements themselves, as distinguished from durational provisions,20 Footnote
E.g., McCarthy v. Phila. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (ordinance requiring city employees to be and to remain city residents upheld). See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974) . See also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (bona fide residency requirement for free tuition to public schools). and the cases do not inhibit the states when, having reasons for doing so, they bar travel by certain persons.21 Footnote
Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (statute made it a misdemeanor to abandon a dependent child but a felony to commit the offense and then leave the state).

Footnotes 1 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–03 (1999) . back 2 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972) . Because the right to travel is implicated by state distinctions between residents and nonresidents, the relevant constitutional provision is the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, § 2, cl. 1. back 3 Intrastate travel is protected to the extent that the classification fails to meet equal protection standards in some respect. Compare Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d. per curiam, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) , with Arlington County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) . The same principle applies in the Commerce Clause cases, in which discrimination may run against in-state as well as out-of-state concerns. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) . back 4 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31, 638 (1969) ; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338–42 (1972) ; Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) ; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 420–21 (1981) . See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 236–39 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), and id. at 285–92 (Stewart and Blackmun, JJ., and Burger, C.J.). back 5 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis by Court); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1971) . back 6 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (both cases in context of direct restrictions on travel). The source of the right to travel and the reasons for reliance on the Equal Protection Clause are questions puzzled over and unresolved by the Court. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758, 759 (1966) , and id. at 763–64 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), id. at 777 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969) , and id. at 671 ((Harlan, J., dissenting); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1973) ; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417–19 (1981) ; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982) , and id. at 66–68 (Brennan, J., concurring), 78–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). back 7 394 U.S. 618 (1969) . back 8 The durational residency provision established by Congress for the District of Columbia was also voided. 394 U.S. at 641–42 . back 9 394 U.S. at 627–33 . Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) , aff’d sub nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970) , struck down a provision construed so as to bar only persons who came into the state solely to obtain welfare assistance. back 10 394 U.S. at 633–38 . Shapiro was reaffirmed in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down durational residency requirements for aliens applying for welfare assistance), and in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (voiding requirement of one year’s residency in county as condition to indigent’s receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at county’s expense). When Connecticut and New York reinstituted the requirements, pleading a financial emergency as the compelling state interest, they were summarily rebuffed. Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971) , aff’d per curiam, 404 U.S. 1054 (1972) ; Lopez v. Wyman , Civ. No.

(W.D.N.Y. 1971) , aff’d per curiam, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972) . The source of the funds, state or federal, is irrelevant to application of the principle. Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971) . back 11 405 U.S. 330 (1972) . But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) , and Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) . Durational residency requirements of five and seven years respectively for candidates for elective office were sustained in Kanapaux v. Ellisor , 419 U.S. 891 (1974) , and Sununu v. Stark , 420 U.S. 958 (1975) . back 12 For additional discussion of durational residence as a qualification to vote, see Amdt14.S1.8.6.2 Voter Qualifications. back 13 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999) . back 14 419 U.S. 393 (1975) . Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan dissented on the merits. Id. at 418 . back 15 419 U.S. at 409 . But the Court also indicated that the plaintiff was not absolutely barred from the state courts, but merely required to wait for access (which was true in the prior cases as well and there held immaterial), and that possibly the state interests in marriage and divorce were more exclusive and thus more immune from federal constitutional attack than were the matters at issue in the previous cases. The Court also did not indicate whether it was using strict or traditional scrutiny. back 16 Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) , aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) . Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 & n.9 (1973) , and id. at 456, 464, 467 (dicta). In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974) , the Court, noting the results, stated that “some waiting periods . . . may not be penalties” and thus would be valid. back 17 Saenz v. Roe , 526 U.S. at 505 . back 18 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) . Somewhat similar was the Court’s invalidation on equal protection grounds of a veterans preference for state employment limited to persons who were state residents when they entered military service; four Justices also thought the preference penalized the right to travel. At’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) . back 19 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) , upholding a two-year residence requirement to become an insurance broker, must be considered of questionable validity. Durational periods for admission to the practice of law or medicine or other professions have evoked differing responses by lower courts. back 20 E.g., McCarthy v. Phila. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (ordinance requiring city employees to be and to remain city residents upheld). See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974) . See also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (bona fide residency requirement for free tuition to public schools). back 21 Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (statute made it a misdemeanor to abandon a dependent child but a felony to commit the offense and then leave the state). back